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Abstract 
A potential vehicle to move capital unrecorded out of a country is the misinvoicing of 
international trade transactions. Exporters may understate the export revenue on their invoices 
and importers may overstate import expenditures, while their trading partners are instructed to 
deposit the balance for their benefit in a foreign account. Aiming to quantify the extent of 
trade mispricing, studies have analyzed asymmetries in matched partner trade statistics or 
examined price anomalies in transaction level price data. This paper critically reviews these 
empirical approaches and briefly describes an alternative methodology. Overall, the accuracy 
and reliability of estimates of illicit financial flows based on trade mispricing are questioned. 
In particular, it is argued that estimates of trade mispricing are critically dependent on 
assumptions on how to interpret observed asymmetries in trade statistics. For instance, 
various reasons for discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics are discussed, and incentives for 
faking trade invoices other than capital flight are highlighted. Also, aggregate trade data may 
mask considerable variation in trade discrepancies at the transaction level. Most notably, the 
importance of trade mispricing as a method for the unrecorded cross-border transfer of capital 
is generally unclear. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The (in-)accuracy of international trade statistics has recently (once more) become an 
issue of much debate. Trade data are often critically reviewed (more than other economic 
statistics) for at least three reasons. First, data on international trade are of considerable 
economic relevance. Cross-border shipments of goods and services often have sizable effects 
on a country’s economic activity. Also, for some countries, taxes on international trade 
constitute a sizable share of government revenue. Second, a country’s trade data allow, in 
principle, for full cross-check with data from other countries. Individual trade transactions are 
recorded separately by both trading partners so that it should be quite easy to compare these 
records. As Naya and Morgan (1974, p. 124) note: “Comparable double accounts are not 
usually available for domestic economic transactions.” Finally, recent research has re-
emphasized that trade activities are subject to criminal behavior. Fisman and Wei (2009) 
show that smuggling of cultural property is related to the level of corruption in the country of 
origin. Baldwin (2006) discusses the effect of value-added tax (VAT) fraud on intra-European 
trade figures. 
A feature of international trade statistics that has frequently attracted considerable 
attention is the potential asymmetry in partner country trade statistics due to mispricing. More 
specifically, it has been argued that the faking of trade invoices is a commonly used method to 
move money out of developing countries. When trade declarations are manipulated such that 
the stated value of imports exceeds their actual value (overinvoicing) and/or the stated value 
of exports is below their actual value (underinvoicing), financial resources are implicitly 
transferred abroad without any official record being made. Conversely, it is assumed that in 
order to proxy for such illicit financial flows (often labelled ‘capital flight’), trade statistics 
may provide some useful empirical indication. For instance, Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) 
explore gaps in mirror trade statistics; see Bhagwati, Krueger and (1974) for an early 
contribution. De Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz (2004) examine the variation of trade prices at 
transaction level. 
This paper provides a detailed discussion of issues associated with trade mispricing. 
The paper reviews various incentives for faking trade invoices, critically examines empirical 
approaches to quantify the extent of mispricing (thereby also highlighting other potential 
reasons for discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics), and analyzes differences in mirror trade 
statistics at the product level (which are possibly associated with mispricing behavior). It also 
assesses how trade mispricing may be reflected in capital flight and illicit flows estimates. 
 2
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I review evidence on 
asymmetries in international trade statistics. Illicit financial flows are typically generated by 
underinvoicing exports and overinvoicing imports. However, dozens of other reasons for 
over- and underinvoicing of trade activities have been identified in the literature; these 
reasons include, among others, overinvoicing of exports to benefit from export subsidies and 
underinvoicing of imports to avoid payment of import tariffs. As a result, some of these 
misinvoicing activities may offset each other. In addition, there are other reasons for incorrect 
trade invoices and thus discrepancies in official trade figures. These manipulations may be the 
result of intended (criminal) behavior such as smuggling or carousel fraud (explained below). 
Similarly, however, they could simply reflect inaccuracies in compiling trade figures (e.g., 
due to the Rotterdam effect) and thus result from unintended behavior. 
Based on the discussion of incentives for misreporting trade flows, empirical 
approaches to quantify the extent of mispricing are analyzed. The DOTS approach in Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008) and the work by Pak and Zdanowicz are critically reviewed. 
Finally, the paper examines how trade mispricing fits into the illicit flows estimates. 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) use the gap in trade statistics (along with other approaches) 
to provide detailed estimates of illicit financial flows by country. This section examines the 
robustness of their findings. For instance, results are compared to estimates derived from the 
product level approach of Fisman and Wei (2009). Similarly, it may be useful to relate their 
estimates of illicit flows to other country characteristics which have been found to be 
associated with trade mispricing such as corruption. 
 
 
2. Discrepancies in Trade Statistics 
 
Conceptually, country i’s exports to country j are equivalent to j’s imports from i. In 
practice, however, recorded trade figures in official matched partner country trade statistics 
differ. The reasons for asymmetries in trade statistics are manifold; they can be broadly 
grouped into two categories: legitimate statistical reasons and intended misdeclaration. For 
illustration, I briefly summarize some of the main explanations for the discrepancy in 
officially reported exports and imports figures. Morgenstern (1950), in a classical paper, 
provides a more detailed account. 
 
2.1 Statistical Reasons 
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The most notable source of discrepancy between the exports of one country and the 
imports of the other is the conceptual difference in valuation. Exporting countries report the 
value of goods at the initial point of departure (f.o.b.), while import values refer to the value at 
the point of final destination, thereby including the costs of freight and insurance (c.i.f.).1 As a 
result, the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio has been frequently used in the literature as a measure of 
transportation costs. Limão and Venables (2001) provide a recent application of this 
approach; see Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) for a detailed critique.  
Apart from the different treatment of shipping costs, there are other methodological 
difficulties when exploring matched partner trade statistics. For instance, the correct 
identification of the source or destination country might be a problem. When the country of 
final destination is not known at the time of exportation, the exporter declares the country of 
last shipment; the country of final destination, in contrast, classifies its imports by country of 
origin. Herrigan, Kochen and Williams (2005, p. 9) provide an illustration of this ‘Rotterdam 
effect’ in trade statistics. They note (p. 9) that “crude oil is imported from the UK via 
Portland, Maine in the USA, and then sent by pipeline to Canada. This is recorded in Canada 
as an import from the UK, whereas the UK records an export to the USA. The USA do not 
record either flow, as it is simple transit. Thus the UK records more oil exports to the USA 
then they record importing, and recorded less oil exports to Canada then they record 
importing.”  
Another potential issue of importance is timing. Since there are often notable time lags 
between the departure and arrival of a shipment (e.g., due to long-distance sea cargo, a delay 
in customs declaration or temporary storage in a warehouse), trade could be recorded in 
different calendar years. More importantly, statistical offices in the source and destination 
country may value goods at different prices and/or exchange rates. Finally, recorded trade at 
the commodity level may differ due to the omission of individual transactions in one of the 
partner countries (e.g., because of varying thresholds for low value trade across countries), the 
exclusion of certain product groups in a country’s trade statistics (such as military material or 
repair trade) or differences in commodity classification (e.g., a regrouping of a transaction 
into chapter 99, which covers items not elsewhere classified, for reasons of confidentiality). 
 
2.2 Fraudulent Trade Activities 
                                                 
1 This difference is based on agreed guidelines for international trade statistics as published by 
the United Nations International Merchandise Trade Statistics: Concepts and Definitions. 
Some countries, however, also report imports on f.o.b. basis (e.g., Australia). 
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Discrepancies in trade statistics may also result from intended misdeclaration of trade 
activities. Transactions may be hidden completely (so that official statistics underreport 
trade), mispriced in trade invoices (with a priori unknown effects on trade statistics), or purely 
imaginary (so that trade is overstated in the data). 
 
Unreported Trade 
In order for unreported trade activities (i.e., smuggling) to affect asymmetries in 
partner country trade statistics, the transactions have to be recorded by one of the partners. 
This is the set-up that Fisman and Wei (2009) have in mind. For antiques and cultural 
property, there are often strong export restrictions such that there is an incentive to smuggle 
the goods unrecorded out of the country. Imports, however, are properly declared since there 
are generally no constraints for entry of such goods, and there is even the risk of seizure when 
there is false declaration. 
 
Fictitious Trade 
An example of imaginary trade transactions (where official trade figures are artificially 
inflated) is missing trader VAT fraud in intra-European Union trade. For intra-Community 
trade, for which no barriers to trade exist and, thus, there are no customs declarations, trade 
statistics rely on the VAT system; that is, firms declare to fiscal authorities, as part of the 
VAT return, trade activities with customers and suppliers in European Union member 
countries. Trade statistics are then affected by two types of VAT fraud. In acquisition fraud, 
goods are regularly imported VAT free and then sold on the home market (e.g., to the next 
trader) at a price including VAT. Instead of paying over the VAT to tax authorities, however, 
the importer disappears. As a result, because of the missing VAT declaration, imports also 
remain unrecorded. A more elaborate version of this form of criminal attack on the VAT 
system is carousel fraud where, after a series of sales through home companies, the imported 
goods are re-exported again to the country of origin (or any other EU member country) and, 
thus, move in a circular pattern. Again, “exports” are properly declared, while “imports” are 
not captured in trade data which may lead to substantial asymmetries in partner country trade 
statistics. When in 2003 the United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics made corrections 
to trade figures for VAT fraud, real GDP growth for previous years was lowered by up to 0.2 
percentage points.2 
                                                 
2 See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/qnabrief0903.pdf. Ruffles, Tily, Caplan and Tudor 
(2003) provide a more detailed description. 
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Misreported Trade 
Finally, trade may be recorded but invoices are faked such that the declared value of a 
trade transaction deviates from its true value. A plausible explanation for trade mispricing is 
capital flight. When there are exchange restrictions, overinvoicing of imports and 
underinvoicing of exports is a popular method for the unrecorded moving of capital out of the 
country. However, there are other reasonable explanations for mispricing. Some of these 
explanations work in a similar direction. For instance, underreporting of exports allows firms 
to acquire foreign exchange that is not disclosed to national authorities; the foreign currency 
can then be freely used by exporters without complying with any controls and regulations 
(e.g., a potential option may be the sale of foreign currency in the parallel exchange rate 
market). Further, authorities may use information on firms’ export activities to infer their 
production. As a result, firms that seek to hide output (e.g., to evade domestic taxes) will 
automatically also seek to hide exports. Dabla-Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) provide 
a description of informal activities by firms. 
Others work in the opposite direction. For instance, when there are import restrictions, 
there is an incentive to underinvoice imports; misdeclaration of cargo is an obvious solution 
to circumvent these trade restrictions. Bhagwati (1964) provides an early empirical 
assessment of such activities. Similarly, to benefit from export subsidies, exports can be 
overinvoiced. Celasun and Rodrik (1989) argue that a sizable share of the increase in Turkish 
exports after 1980 is due to a change in invoicing practices of domestic entrepreneurs (in 
order to take advantage of generous export subsidies). 
 
2.3 Summary 
The finding that official trade statistics may suffer from misreporting and faked 
declarations is a well-known fact, not only to statisticians of international trade. Bhagwati 
(1964, 1967) provides an early economic discussion of incentives for misinvoicing in trade; 
Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) develop a trade model to examine the welfare effects of 
smuggling. 
Using trade statistics in turn to quantify the extent of misreporting, however, appears 
to be difficult. For one thing, misreporting can work in either direction so that some activities 
may offset each other in aggregate trade statistics. Also, the extent to which transactions are 
reported at all (and thus show up in the trade statistics of at least one of the trade partners) 
may vary. Measures of increased surveillance of trade transactions have apparently little 
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measurable effect.3 Finally, discrepancies in trade statistics may simply arise from statistical 
factors. A quantitative assessment of such factors in a bilateral context has been provided for 
trade flows between Australia and the European Union, for which reported trade figures differ 
on average by about 10% between the two trade partners. Table 1 summarizes the results. As 
shown, the largest source of discrepancy between recorded exports and imports is the 
difference in (c.i.f./f.o.b.) valuation which inflates European import data by on average about 
9%. In contrast, goods which are imported by Australia and are subsequently re-exported to 
the European Union may have initially artificially lowered the discrepancy (since they are 
recorded in Australia’s exports but not in the European Union’s imports). In view of all these 
difficulties, the European Union, though aiming to reduce the declaration burden on 
businesses, still refrains from using mirror (single-flow) trade statistics.4 
 
 
3. Trade Mispricing and Illicit Financial Flows 
 
Illicit financial flows are, by definition, unobservable in official statistics. However, 
based on the assumption that trade mispricing is an important method for the unrecorded 
moving of capital out of the country, a number of papers have examined data from trade 
statistics to provide some rough empirical indication about the magnitude of such illicit 
financial flows. In the following, I discuss two of these approaches in detail: the analysis of 
asymmetries in trade statistics, and the analysis of price anomalies in transaction-level trade 
data. 
 
3.1 Conceptual Issues 
Before I proceed, it may be useful to briefly address some conceptual issues on the 
definition of illicit financial flows. When describing capital flows, often very different 
concepts are applied to classify capital transactions. For instance, as noted in the IMF’s (1992, 
p. 89) Final Report of the Working Party on the Measurement of International Capital Flows, 
there is an occasional tendency to identify any capital outflow from a country as ‘capital 
flight’. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) appear to follow this (broadest possible) approach 
                                                 
3 Winston (1974, p. 64) argues: “[R]egardless of the sincerity of efforts, it is virtually 
impossible to control overinvoicing considering the myriad ways it can, in fact, be done.” 
4 For an early attempt, see the European Commission’s “Simpler Legislation for the Internal 
Market (SLIM)” initiative, which is documented at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/simplification/index_en.htm. 
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for capital outflows from developing countries; they argue (p. iii): “The term flight capital is 
most commonly applied in reference to money that shifts out of developing countries, usually 
into western economies.” 
While this approach may be applicable, a possible shortcoming of this very general 
definition is that it also covers all standard (or ‘normal’) cross-border capital transactions. 
Therefore, a number of authors prefer taking a more restrictive approach that includes only a 
subset of capital movements and also justifies the negative connotation (‘capital flight’). 
Walter (1987), for instance, emphasizes the importance of motivations for flight (such as 
macroeconomic mismanagement or fear of confiscation) by arguing that “capital flight is 
capital that flees”. Cumby and Levich (1987) focus on the type of transaction by excluding 
“all freely organized legal transactions” from their definition of capital flight. In summary, it 
might seem reasonable to distinguish capital transactions along various dimensions, such as 
the source of capital, the method of transfer and/or the motivation for the transaction.  
A similar reasoning may also apply to the definition of illicit financial flows. Again, 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) provide a very comprehensive approach, treating all 
unrecorded capital transfers as illegal and note, more generally, that (p. iv) “illicit money is 
money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized”.5 Another plausible definition, by 
contrast, also takes into account the motivation for such behavior. Illicit financial flows may 
then be defined as any capital transaction that intentionally moves capital unrecordedly out of 
a country, with trade mispricing being one of (potentially many) possible conduits for such 
conduct.6 
 
3.2 Examining Asymmetries in Trade Data 
A prominent approach to quantifying the extent of misinvoicing is the analysis of 
matched partner country trade statistics. Based on the principle of double counting in trade 
statistics, a country’s exports to a partner are compared to what the partner reports as having 
imported (‘mirror statistics’). The difference may then provide a reasonable indication of 
illicit flows that occur through mispricing. A recent application of this approach is Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008); an early contribution is Bhagwati, Krueger and Wibulswasdi 
(1974). 
                                                 
5 Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008, p. iii) argue that “by far the greater part of unrecorded 
flows are indeed illicit, violating the national criminal and civil codes, tax laws, customs 
regulations, VAT assessments, exchange control requirements and banking regulations of the 
countries out of which unrecorded/illicit flows occur”. 
6 For instance, for some transactions, avoidance of trade taxes rather than capital transfer may 
be the primary motivation. 
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Trade Asymmetries ≠ Mispricing 
Any estimate of illicit financial flows derived from asymmetries in trade statistics has 
to deal explicitly with three types of problems. The most notable issue is related to the 
accuracy of trade statistics in general. As noted before, partner country trade data typically 
differ for various reasons. As a result, trade figures have to be adjusted before any possibly 
remaining statistical asymmetry can be reasonably interpreted as being due to mispricing. At a 
minimum, trade data have to be corrected for differences in valuation which is most likely to 
be the main reason for a discrepancy in mirror statistics. However, information on 
transportation costs which are needed for the conversion from f.o.b. to c.i.f. values are rare; it 
is for precisely this reason that some trade economists have used the c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio as a 
proxy for transportation costs.7  
To deal with this issue when seeking to identify mispricing, two approaches have been 
frequently applied in the literature. First, the analysis may focus particularly on episodes in 
which f.o.b. export values exceed the corresponding c.i.f. import values. Since the latter 
includes additional price components (transportation costs) and, therefore, should, by 
definition, be larger than the former, such ‘perverse’ statistical findings may indicate that 
mispricing has occurred; this argument has been first made in an empirical analysis of 
underinvoicing of imports in Bhagwati (1964). Capital outflows through trade mispricing, 
however, work exactly in the opposite direction; these activities are associated with 
overinvoicing of imports and underinvoicing of exports which tend to inflate the observed 
difference between c.i.f. and f.o.b. values so that this approach is of little help. 
Second, a number of papers apply a flat c.i.f./f.o.b. conversion factor. Typically, with 
reference to conventions by international organizations, a 10 percent difference between c.i.f. 
and f.o.b. values is assumed. For instance, when using partner data to supplement their trade 
database, the International Monetary Fund generally applies a c.i.f./f.o.b. factor of 1.1; see 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/dot/DOTEstim.htm. Any discrepancy in mirror statistics that 
exceeds this correction might then be attributed to mispricing; see, for instance, Bhagwati, 
Krueger and Wibulswasdi (1974). However, this approach provides, at best, only a very crude 
empirical indication for the potential presence of misinvoicing since the assumption of a fixed 
conversion factor that varies neither over time nor among trading partners is clearly 
challenging. 
 
                                                 
7 For an early critical assessment of this approach, see Moneta (1959). 
 9
Mispricing ≠ Illicit Flows 
To the extent that discrepancies in trade statistics indeed reflect mispricing, over- and 
underinvoicing of trade transactions may be completely unrelated to illicit financial flows 
(narrowly defined). An obvious reason to underinvoice trade is to avoid payment of trade 
taxes; similarly, overinvoicing allows benefiting from trade subsidies. More specifically, 
when export duties are ad valorem, the motive to reduce the effective tax rate by 
underinvoicing exports is indistinguishable from a flight-motivated capital outflow in the 
analysis of mirror statistics in international trade. In similar fashion, overinvoicing of imports 
(for other reasons than capital flight) may occur when a firm seeks to reduce its before-tax 
profits (and hence the effective tax on profits) by overstating the cost of imported inputs. As a 
result, an assumption has to be made to what extent trade mispricing is indeed a channel for 
illicit flows. 
 
Illicit Flows ≠ Trade Asymmetries 
Conversely, it is questionable to what extent illicit flows are indeed detectable from 
asymmetries in aggregate trade data. Various incentives for faking trade invoices that work 
exactly in the opposite direction than the capital flight motives can be identified. The effects 
of these explanations on trade (that is, underinvoicing of imports and overinvoicing of 
exports) have been widely documented. For instance, Celasun and Rodrik (1989, p. 723) note 
that the introduction of export subsidies in Turkey in the early 1980s has led to substantial 
overinvoicing. “Turkish entrepreneurs, never too shy in exploiting arbitrage opportunities, 
used the wedge [between the profitability of manufactures exports and the profitability of 
other means of earning foreign exchange] to their advantage.” Celasun and Rodrik conclude 
(p. 729-730): “Once fictitious exports are eliminated, the average growth rate of Turkish 
exports … is not nearly as spectacular as [that] … calculated from official statistics.” The 
existence of obvious incentives for underinvoicing of imports has been recently documented 
empirically in Yang (2008). Yang examines an increase in enforcement in Philippine customs 
that targets a specific method of avoiding import duties. He nicely illustrates that increased 
enforcement (by lowering the minimum value threshold for pre-shipment customs inspection 
for shipments from a subset of origin countries) reduced the targeted duty-avoidance method, 
but caused substantial displacement to an alternative method (shipping via duty-exempt 
export processing zones). 
In sum, there are various motives for mispricing in trade invoices. Table 2 lists some 
of these motives; see also Dornbusch and Kuenzler (1993, p. 110). As these effects partly 
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work in opposite directions, they may easily cancel each other out at the aggregate trade level. 
For instance, when a shipment is underinvoiced in the exporting country in order to move 
unrecorded capital out of the country, and the shipment carries the same mispriced invoice in 
the importing country in order to evade import tariffs, no discrepancy in mirror trade statistics 
will occur.8 Reviewing the various motives, Bhagwati, Krueger and Wibulswasdi (1974) 
argue that underinvoicing of exports, rather than overinvoicing of imports, is more often used 
as a vehicle of capital flight, also because export controls are less restrictive. Gulati (1987) 
even finds that, when faking trade invoices, underinvoicing of imports more than outweighs 
underinvoicing of exports so that for a number of countries (illicit) capital inflows are 
observed. 
 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) 
In view of these difficulties, it is interesting to review recent estimates of capital flight 
due to trade mispricing provided by Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008).9 These authors analyze 
international trade statistics, address the above-mentioned relevant issues in a consistent and 
transparent way, and estimate, based on this analysis, the volume and pattern of illicit 
financial flows. While their efforts have provoked useful debate, it should also be clear, 
however, that the reliability of the estimates crucially hinges on the assumptions made and 
conventions chosen. 
A first set of methodological issues in Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) relates to the 
interpretation of observed asymmetries in matched partner trade statistics. As noted before, 
trade asymmetries may arise for a variety of reasons and, therefore, do not necessarily reflect 
trade mispricing. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) acknowledge the difficulty in properly 
identifying mispricing from trade data by providing a definition for trade asymmetries of 
interest. Specifically, after a careful discussion of the limitations of various models in 
estimating illicit flows, they provide two sets of estimates of trade mispricing by country. In 
their baseline model, they apply a ‘gross excluding reversals (GER)’ method. This method is 
based on the assumption that episodes of bilateral export underinvoicing and import 
overinvoicing reflect capital outflows, while they argue that episodes of pair-wise trade gaps 
                                                 
8 A more fundamental issue is that illicit flows through trade mispricing may not necessarily 
show up in trade invoices (e.g., when there are inofficial agreements). 
9 Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) also apply other methods (such as the World Bank 
residual model) to derive estimates of illicit financial flows. Since one term in the 
computation of the World Bank residual is the current account balance which may be 
distorted downward by trade mispricing, both results are added to obtain an aggregate 
estimate. 
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in the opposite direction (possibly representing capital inflows) are spurious due to data issues 
(and therefore simply set to zero). As a result, when a country reports low export figures 
relative to recorded imports in the corresponding partner country, this discrepancy is defined, 
according to Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008), as mispricing. In contrast, a statistical 
discrepancy similar in magnitude that results from the same country’s relatively large exports 
vis-à-vis another partner’s imports is, by definition, ignored. This selective interpretation of 
trade asymmetries appears to artificially inflate estimates of illicit financial flows. Indeed, 
when offsetting capital flows are additionally taken into account, a country’s ‘net’ position is 
obtained, which is often sizably lower than the estimated GER result. With this extension, 
many aggregate country estimates even change signs. However, Kar and Cartwright-Smith 
(2008) argue that the results derived from this method are distorted and ‘unrealistic’ and focus 
instead on the GER approach. 
Kar and Cartwright-Smith’s (2008) interpretation becomes particularly troublesome 
when the treatment of transportation costs in their analysis is also taken into consideration. A 
major source of discrepancy between exports and corresponding imports is the difference in 
valuation concepts so that c.i.f. imports must be converted to f.o.b. values. Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008) apply a c.i.f./f.o.b. conversion factor that is fixed (at 1.1) across all 
bilateral country pairs (irrespective of trade distance and the commodity composition of trade) 
and over time. In practice, however, c.i.f./f.o.b. ratios in international trade statistics often lie 
outside a reasonable range of variation. According to Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006), 
roughly half of all observations in the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics database lie outside 
a (1,2) range (which would be consistent with ad valorem transportation costs between 0% 
and 100%); the remaining observations contain substantial errors in levels. Still, Kar and 
Cartwright-Smith (2008) classify, after a flat 1.1 correction, any c.i.f./f.o.b. ratio larger than 
one as evidence of trade mispricing, while ratios below this threshold (often covering 
substantial fractions of trade) are treated as noise.10 
Another set of issues refers to the difficulty of identifying mispricing and estimating 
illicit financial flows from aggregate trade data. Mispricing occurs at the level of the 
individual trade transaction, whereas Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) examine trade 
asymmetries at the country level. Their focus on aggregate trade, however, is likely to 
produce inconsistent results. Assume, for instance, that trade gaps at the commodity level 
cancel each other out at the aggregate level; these trade gaps remain uncaptured in Kar and 
                                                 
10 Hummels and Lugovskyy (2006) note that for the United States and New Zealand episodes 
in which f.o.b. exports exceed corresponding c.i.f. imports constitute about one-third of the 
IMF data. 
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Cartwright-Smith (2008), potentially leading to aggregation bias. More realistically, when 
trade gaps are concentrated in a few product categories with serious difficulties in properly 
reporting trade flows (e.g., crude oil), the resulting trade asymmetries at the country level are 
taken as evidence of trade mispricing (and, thus, illicit financial flows). 
Moreover, any pooled estimate of asymmetries in aggregate trade data may mask 
considerable variation in export and import behavior. Therefore, when computing trade gaps 
for a large set of countries, it appears particularly helpful to distinguish between, and report 
results separately for, underinvoicing of exports and overinvoicing of imports. In principle, 
there should be no difference between the two methods: both activities involve faking of trade 
declarations, and both activities may be instruments to facilitate illicit capital flows. In 
practice, however, there are typically large differences in the observed degrees of export 
underinvoicing and import overinvoicing; see, for instance, Gulati (1987). Bhagwati, Krueger 
and Wibulswasdi (1974) argue that especially the incentive to overinvoice imports, as a 
vehicle of capital flight, is often overcome by other motives to fake trade invoices. As a result, 
there is an asymmetry of conduit-behavior for illicit financial flows which should be 
documented in empirical findings to aid proper interpretation of the results. 
 
3.3 Examining Transaction-Level Price Data 
In a series of papers, Simon Pak and John Zdanowicz analyze price data in 
transaction-level trade statistics. In a typical analysis, such as de Boyrie, Pak and Zdanowicz 
(2005), the authors examine information from individual export declarations and entry forms 
in U.S. external trade. The data set is huge; it contains about two million records per year.11 
Specifically, Pak and Zdanowicz are interested in the product code, the partner country 
involved in the trade, and the price quoted in the trade document. With this set of information, 
it is possible to analyze, for each product-country pair, the range of prices recorded in trade 
transactions. More notably, based on this price range, transactions with ‘abnormal’ prices can 
be identified; Pak and Zdanowicz define prices that fall outside the interquartile range as 
‘abnormal’. These improperly priced transactions are then assumed to constitute illegal capital 
flows, with the capital outflow being determined by the dollar value of over- or 
underinvoicing of a transaction based on its deviation from interquartile prices. 
 
What is a Product? 
                                                 
11 The data are obtained from the U.S. Merchandise Trade Database. 
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Although Pak and Zdanowicz’s idea of using micro-level trade data is generally 
intuitive, their approach is not without difficulties. An obvious issue is the definition of a 
product. Pak and Zdanowicz rely on the harmonized classification of products in international 
trade statistics. At the most detailed level (for U.S. external trade), this commodity code 
system contains about 20,000 product categories. It is unknown, however, whether these 
products are indeed homogeneous; there may be considerable differences in product 
characteristics (such as quality) and, thus, in product prices within categories. As a result, the 
price range within a category may be wide so that mispriced transactions remain undetected. 
Alternatively, a transaction may be mistakenly identified as improperly priced when most 
transactions within a category are in low-value products, while a single transaction is in an 
expensive high-quality product. 
The relevance of product definitions has been recently highlighted by Javorcik and 
Narciso (2008). Javorcik and Narciso argue that there is broader scope for faking invoices in 
differentiated products because it is difficult to assess the quality and thus the price of such 
products. Examining trade gaps in mirror trade statistics for German exports to 10 Eastern 
European countries, they find that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the level of tariffs is 
greater for differentiated products than for homogeneous goods. 
In addition, it should be mentioned that the product categories are defined for customs 
purposes. This implies, for instance, that some products are properly and tightly defined, 
while there are plenty of product codes that simply collect all other types of products. For 
illustration, consider the description of the 2009 harmonized tariff schedule, available online 
at http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts/index.htm. The tariff schedule lists 28,985 product categories 
(including sub-headings) of which about one-half (12,581 categories) contain the catch-all 
phrase ‘other’ in their description. Examples are given in Table 3. As shown, the first 
category of heading 4901 covers printed material in single sheets; this material is categorized 
into “reproduction proofs” and all “other” single-sheet material – the other single-sheet 
material may range from plain black-and-white leaflets to expensive art prints on special 
paper without any further qualification in the customs statistics. The category “art books” is 
divided into sub-categories by price: less than 5 dollars or more than 5 dollars for each book. 
However, it is obvious that art books that cost more than 5 dollars may still vary considerably 
in style, format and quality (and therefore also price). Finally, the unit of quantity for 
“tankers” is the number of ships; differences in size and equipment of such ships may imply 
considerable price differences per unit. 
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Abnormal Prices 
Another challenge for the Pak and Zdanowicz approach is the arbitrary definition of 
abnormal prices.12 The focus on the interquartile price range appears to be taken from U.S. 
legal regulations for detecting transfer pricing manipulation in trade between related parties. 
However, there is no economic reason to describe prices above or below a certain threshold 
level a priori as ‘abnormal’. In fact, even for products with minor variations in prices, the 
method may, under specific circumstances, identify improper pricing. 
More importantly, any analysis that is based on the distribution of prices appears to be 
sensitive to the number of observations. For example, transactions for products for which a 
similar range of traded prices is observed may be classified as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ pricing, 
depending on the number of trade transactions. Alternatively, the occurrence of an additional 
data point may lead to a reclassification of a transaction from ‘normal’ to ‘abnormal’ pricing 
and vice versa. In general, the distribution of prices should become more representative the 
more price observations are available. For many products, however, there are typically only 
very few bilateral trade transactions. 
 
Price Variations over Time 
With the mechanical classification of prices above or below a certain threshold as 
faked, the results are potentially difficult to interpret. Variation of prices at the transaction 
level may arise for various reasons. These reasons may be trivial such as mistakes in filling 
the form. However, there may be also differences in prices across markets (both 
internationally and within the U.S.). Also, when the variation of prices over a longer time 
horizon is analyzed, transaction dates may matter. For instance, seasonality may lead to 
considerable price fluctuations.13 
 
Quantity Faking 
An issue that remains untouched by the Pak and Zdanowicz approach is misinvoicing 
of quantities. Instead of faking prices or unit values, the invoice is faked by misstating the 
quantity being shipped; that is, the container contains a different quantity than invoiced. 
Although perhaps more detectable than unit value faking, Bhagwati (1981, p. 417) notes that 
                                                 
12 See also the discussion in Fuest and Riedel (2011). 
13 Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) examine monthly price data for approximately 20,000 
imported goods and find that the (trade-weighted) median price duration in the currency of 
pricing is 10.6 months. 
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this is a “rather common form of illegality”. In addition, there are other ways of misinvoicing, 
including, for instance, the omission of invoiced spare parts. 
 
Trade Pairs 
Since Pak and Zdanowicz’s results are exclusively based on data from U.S. customs, it 
is unclear to what extent their results can be generalized. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
faking of trade invoices occurs especially in trade with a main trading partner which is not 
necessarily the United States. For instance, Celasun and Rodrik (1989) find strong evidence of 
misreporting only in Turkey’s trade with Germany. For African countries, trade with South 
Africa, the regional economic and financial center, may be the preferred target for 
misdeclaration. 
 
 
4. Trade Asymmetries: An Empirical Analysis14 
 
For illustration, I briefly examine trade asymmetries at the commodity level. In this 
empirical exercise, I use the United Nations Comtrade database to obtain exports and imports 
data at the 4-digit (HS) product level. The database contains detailed (annual) trade statistics 
reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or territories and standardized by 
the UN Statistics Division; I examine the records of shipments to the five largest importing 
nations in the world (United States, Germany, China, United Kingdom and Japan). At the 4-
digit level, there are more than 1,200 product categories. I use the most recent commodity 
classification (HS-2002); the data are available for five years, covering the period from 2002 
to 2006. 
I begin by exploring the full sample of annual country pair-specific trade gaps at the 4-
digit product level. That is, I compute, for each country pair and product, the percentage 
difference between reported imports and corresponding exports. Table 4 lists the five largest 
discrepancies in bilateral trade by importer along with the exporter and the 4-digit product 
code. Interestingly, a few empirical regularities emerge from this rough tabulation. For 
instance, most experiences where recorded import values strongly exceed corresponding 
exports appear to be concentrated in one single product category, ‘petroleum oils, crude’ (HS 
code 2709). As Yeats (1978) notes, this discrepancy is often due to problems in valuing 
petroleum, and the frequent diversion of petroleum exports from its original destination en 
                                                 
14 This section draws on Berger and Nitsch (2012). 
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route. For other product categories, in contrast, export values (despite disregarding 
transportation costs) are considerably larger than imports in mirror statistics; these categories 
include ‘other aircraft (for example, helicopters, aeroplanes), spacecraft’ (8802), ‘cruise ships, 
excursion boats, ferry-boats, cargo ships, barges and similar vessels for the transport of 
persons or goods’ (8901) and ‘gold (including gold plated with platinum)’ (7108). A possible 
explanation is that, especially for bulky items with low-frequency trading, the time lag 
between exportation and importation may be of particular importance. Also, to the extent that 
there is any geographical pattern in misreporting, over-invoicing of exports appears to be a 
more frequent problem in trade with neighboring countries. 
To further analyze the geographical pattern in misreporting, I examine differences in 
trade gaps across countries in more detail. In particular, I aim to identify countries that 
consistently understate their exports (and, thus, appear to be particularly prone to trade 
mispricing or smuggling). In a first exercise, I compute for each exporter the average trade 
gap across all products. Since there may be sizable product-specific differences in reported 
trade values between the exporting and the importing country, taking the arithmetic mean of 
these reporting gaps over often hundreds of products is a simple way to (hopefully) identify 
country-specific differences in trade reporting. Table 5 lists the five countries with the largest 
average percentage share of missing exports by importer. As shown, I find indeed a strong 
and consistent mismatch in international trade statistics, with continuous underreporting, for 
instance, by Equatorial Guinea, Indonesia and the Philippines. More importantly, reviewing 
the full distribution of exporting countries, it turns out that the extent to which countries tend 
to misreport exports is broadly similar across trade destinations. The correlation of exporter-
specific average trade gaps across importing countries is astonishingly high, on the order of 
about 0.9. Table 6 reports a set of simple bivariate correlation coefficients; (unreported) 
Spearman rank correlations provide similar results. These consistent patterns of misreporting 
in trade appear to provide a useful basis for further research. 
In Berger and Nitsch (2012), for instance, we use regression analysis to examine the 
association between observed trade gaps and country-specific corruption levels. Holding 
constant a variety of other determinants of discrepancies in trade statistics, we find that the 
reporting gap in bilateral trade is indeed strongly associated with the level of corruption, 
especially in the source country. In countries with corrupt bureaucracies, it seems easier (and 
perhaps even common practice) to ignore legal rules and procedures. To the extent that this 
misbehaviour also affects international trade transactions, our findings suggest that reporting 
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gaps in official trade statistics partly reflect illegal activities for which the illicit movement of 
capital may be one motivation. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
A potential vehicle to move capital unrecorded out of a country is the misinvoicing of 
international trade transactions. Exporters may understate the export revenue on their invoices 
and importers may overstate import expenditures, while their trading partners are instructed to 
deposit the balance for their benefit in a foreign account. 
This paper critically reviews empirical approaches to quantify the extent of trade 
mispricing. There are at least two sorts of problems. For one thing, mispricing behavior is 
hard to identify. The analysis of discrepancies in bilateral trade statistics appears to be of 
generally limited value since gaps in trade statistics also typically arise for reasons unrelated 
to mispricing. Another set of issues refers to motivations for fraudulent trade behavior. Even 
if mispricing is properly identified, there are incentives for faking trade invoices other than 
the transfer of capital. 
Overall, the accuracy and reliability of estimates of illicit financial flows based on 
trade mispricing are questioned. This finding is in line with Bhagwati (1967) who argues: 
“Whereas it is easy to establish the conditions under which the faking of trade values […] will 
occur, it is in practice extremely difficult to set about determining whether such faking is 
actually occurring. It is further impossible to find out how much faking is going on.” 
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Table 1: Asymmetries in Australia-EU Trade: A Statistical Practitioner’s Assessment 
 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Australian exports (f.o.b.) 7711 7476 7247 8007 8381 8678
       
Adjustments       
Country classification       
  Australian re-exports -400 -417 -327 -451 -394 -333
  EU indirect imports 101 133 120 137 242 185
  EU re-imports 215 195 240 245 275 315
Exchange rate -25 -4 7 -1 1 -28
Ships 80 -- -- -- -- --
  
Adjusted Australian exports 7682 7383 7286 7937 8504 8815
       
       
EU imports (c.i.f.) 8721 7159 7979 8813 8526 9570
       
Adjustments       
Valuation -728 -605 -658 -737 -708 -795
Timing -93 25 81 54 62 23
Exchange rate -41 13 -7 -- -6 -15
Ships -- -- -- -- 236 --
Non monetary gold 63 484 126 -4 119 
  
Adjusted EU imports 7922 7077 7520 8124 8228 8782
  
  
Discrepancy  
Unadjusted 1010 -316 732 806 145 892
% 13 -4 10 10 2 10
Adjusted 240 -306 235 187 -276 -34
% 3 -4 3 2 -3 --
 
Notes: All figures (except those in italics) in millions of Australian dollars.  
 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1998) 
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Table 2: Motives for Mispricing in International Trade 
 
 
 Overinvoicing Underinvoicing 
Exports Capturing export subsidies Capital flight 
Avoiding export taxes 
Imports Capital flight 
Lowering domestic profits 
Evading import duties 
 
Source: Adapted from Dornbusch and Kuenzler (1993). 
 
 
 23
Table 3: Examples of Product Categories in the Tariff Schedule 
 
 
4901  Printed books, brochures, leaflets and similar printed matter, whether or not in single sheets: 
4901.10.00  In single sheets, whether or not folded 
4901.10.00.20  Reproduction proofs 
4901.10.00.40  Other 
Other: 
4901.91.00  Dictionaries and encyclopedias, and serial installments thereof 
4901.91.00.20  Dictionaries (including thesauruses) 
4901.91.00.40  Encyclopedias 
4901.99.00  Other 
4901.99.00.10  Textbooks 
4901.99.00.20  Bound newspapers, journals and periodicals provided for in Legal Note 3 to this chapter 
4901.99.00.30  Directories 
Other: 
4901.99.00.40  Bibles, testaments, prayer books and other religious books 
4901.99.00.50  Technical, scientific and professional books 
Art and pictorial books: 
4901.99.00.60  Valued under $5 each 
4901.99.00.65  Valued $5 or more each 
Other: 
4901.99.00.70  Hardbound books 
4901.99.00.75  Rack size paperbound books 
Other: 
4901.99.00.91  Containing not more than 4 pages each (excluding covers) 
4901.99.00.92  Containing 5 or more pages each, but not more than 48 pages each (excluding covers) 
4901.99.00.93  Containing 49 or more pages each (excluding covers) 
 
 
 
8901  Cruise ships, excursion boats, ferry boats, cargo ships, barges and similar vessels for the 
transport of persons or goods: 
8901.10.00 00  Cruise ships, excursion boats and similar vessels principally designed for the transport of 
persons; ferry boats of all kinds 
8901.20.00 00  Tankers 
8901.30.00 00  Refrigerated vessels, other than those of subheading 8901.20 
8901.90.00 00  Other vessels for the transport of goods and other vessels for the transport of both persons and 
goods 
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Table 4: Largest trade gaps, 2004 
 
 
Underreporting of exports 
 
Importer: 
USA Germany China United Kingdom Japan 
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap 
SAU 2709 23.8 LBY 2709 22.0 PHL 8542 22.4 BWA 7102 21.5 SAU 2709 23.4 
VEN 2709 23.7 GBR 8803 21.2 AGO 2709 22.3 SAU 2710 20.6 QAT 2709 22.4 
NGA 2709 23.5 DNK 9999 21.2 SAU 2709 22.3 KWT 2710 20.4 IDN 2711 22.3 
IRQ 2709 22.9 SAU 2709 20.7 OMN 2709 22.2 PHL 8542 20.3 KWT 2709 22.1 
AGO 2709 22.2 SYR 2709 20.7 IRN 2709 22.0 EGY 2709 19.7 ARE 2711 21.6 
 
 
 
Overreporting of exports 
 
Importer: 
USA Germany China United Kingdom Japan 
Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap Exp. Prod. Gap 
DEU 8901 -19.9 CHN 8901 -20.3 HKG 8703 -20.8 USA 8803 -21.2 SWE 8802 -18.9 
FIN 8901 -19.9 BEL 0803 -19.8 HKG 4101 -19.3 DEU 8802 -21.0 SGP 2204 -18.5 
PRT 8802 -19.2 AUT 8901 -19.7 HKG 7108 -19.2 HKG 7108 -20.8 SGP 2208 -18.0 
MEX 8602 -19.1 DNK 2716 -19.1 JPN 7108 -18.6 CAN 7108 -20.7 NZL 2709 -17.9 
KOR 8901 -18.7 BLR 2709 -18.7 ARE 9999 -18.5 USA 8802 -20.7 BHR 7604 -17.6 
 
Notes: Gap is defined as the percentage difference between reported imports by the country in 
the top line and corresponding exports reported by the country listed in columns. “Prod.” 
denotes the 4-digit product code. 
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Table 5: Underreporting of exports by country, 2002-2006 
 
 
Importer: 
USA Germany China United 
Kingdom 
Japan All five importers 
Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap Exporter Gap 
Libya 14.5 Equatorial 
Guinea 
12.1 Equatorial 
Guinea 
14.9 Indonesia 12.1 Iraq 16.3 Equatorial 
Guinea 
12.6 
Lesotho 13.5 Indonesia 11.9 Congo 13.5 Lao PDR 11.5 Equatorial 
Guinea 
14.0 Indonesia 12.4 
Indonesia 13.3 Ukraine 11.4 Dem.Rep. 
of Congo 
12.7 Myanmar 11.5 Western 
Sahara 
13.7 Philippines 11.6 
Philippines 12.7 Philippines 11.2 Tchad 11.8 Bouvet 
Island 
11.4 Indonesia 13.2 Iraq 11.4 
Iraq 12.5 Serbia and 
Monte’gro 
11.0 Rwanda 11.8 Falkland 
Isds 
11.2 Botswana 12.8 Western 
Sahara 
11.3 
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Table 6: Correlation of exporter-specific average trade gaps 
 
 
 USA Germany China UK Japan All 
USA 1.0000      
Germany 0.9245 1.0000     
China 0.8357 0.7824 1.0000    
United Kingdom 0.9368 0.9571 0.7986 1.0000   
Japan 0.9015 0.8572 0.8963 0.8582 1.0000  
All 5 importers 0.9700 0.9494 0.9120 0.9564 0.9548 1.0000 
 
Notes: 202 observations. 
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